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160 PEOPLE tI. ATCHLEY [53 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 6450. In Bank. Dee. 1, 1959.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. VERON ATCHLEY, 
Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law - Evidence - Documentary Evidence - Photo-
gra.phs.-When allegedly gruesome photographs are presented, 
the trial court iu the exercise of its judicial discretion must 
decide whether their probative value outweighs their possible 
prejudicial effect. 
[2] Id.-Evidence-Documentary Evidllnce-Photographs.-The 
trial court in an uxoricide case did not abuse its discretion 
in admitting photographs showing the deceased as she was 
found in her front yard, with bullet holes and bloodstains on 
her dress and blood on her face, for the purpose of illustrating 
testimony about her wounds and to show the relative positions 
in which the body and various items of evidence were dis-
covered, or in admitting other photographs showing the de-
ceased lying on a table at the mortuary, naked above the waist, 
with blood smeared on her face, for the purpose of showing 
the location and nature of her wounds and to explain the basis 
for expert opinions as to the position of the gun when the abots 
were fired. 
[3] Id.-Evidence-Documentary Evidence-Photogra.phs.-It was 
within the discretion of the trial court in an uxoricide ease 
to permit all pictures of the deceased taken by the same photog-
rapher to be identified at the same time, though many of them 
were not to be used until later in the trial. . 
[4] Id.-Evidence-Declarations of Defendant-Voluntary Ohar-
acter.-The necessity for determining the voluntary character 
of a statement by defendant does not depend on whether it 
constitutes a confession of guilt. This rule applies to a state-
ment including an important incriminating fact. 
[1] Bee Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 226; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 727. 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 398; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 560. 
McB:. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 522(1) ; [2,3] Crimi-
nal Law, § 522(5); [4, 6] Criminal Law, § 445; [5] Criminal Law, 
§ 467; [7,8] Criminal Law, § 525.5; [9] Criminal Law, § 1382(21); 
[10] Homicide, § 108 j [11] Criminal Law, § 271; Witnesses, § 247; 
[12] Witnesses, § 247; [13] Witnesses, §§ 18, 96; [14] Criminal 
Law, § 619; [15] Criminal Law, § 628; [16] Criminal Law, §§ 1285, 
1404(19); [17, 19] Homicide, § 185; [18] Homicide, § 15(5); [~, 
21] Homicide, § 58; [22] Homicide, § 265. 
CJ 
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[6] ld.-Evidence-Confessions-Voluntariness.-Involuntary con-
fessions are excluded because they are untrustworthy, because 
it offends the community's sense of fair play and decency to 
convict a defendant by evidence extorted from him, and because 
exclusion serves to discourage the use of physical brutality and 
other undue pressure!; in questioning those suspected of crime. 
These reasons for excluding involuntary confessions apply 
also to involuntary admissions. 
[6] ld.-Evidence-Declarations of Defendant-Voluntary Char-
acter.-Any statement by an accused relative to the offense 
charged is inadmissible against him if made linvoluntarily. 
[7] ld.-Evidence-Sound Recordings.-The trial court in an ux-
oricide case did not err in admitting a tape recording of a con-
versation between defendant and his insurance broker, in the 
interrogation room of the county jail, as against the objection 
that the voluntary nature of defendant's statements was not 
adequately shown, where the broker testified that no threats 
were made, that no inducements were offered, and that in an 
earlier conversation defendant had volunteered substantially 
the same statements without being asked, where defendant 
did not contradict this testimony or suggest that any of his 
recorded statements were untrue, and where the recorded 
conversation demonstrated that the broker referred to the 
insurance policy to explain why he was asking questions and 
not as an inducement for any particular answers. 
[8] ld.-Evidence-Sound Recordings.-Mere deception used in 
obtaining a tape recording of a conversation between defend-
ant and his insurance broker did not render defendant's state-
ments inadmissible where the deception was not of a type rea-
sonable likely to procure an untrue statement. 
[9] ld.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence.-Error in sustaining 
an objection to a question asked defendant's insurance broker 
on cross-examination as to whether defendant had complained 
,to the broker of not being permitted by the police to talk to 
a lawyer did not result in prejudice where, though refusal to 
permit defendant to talk to counsel suggested an intent to 
coerce, it was highly improbable that either the trial judge or 
the jury would have inferred coercion from such refusal alone 
in the light of substantial and uncontradicted evidence that 
no coercion occurred. 
[10] Homicide-Evidence-Hearsay-Declarations of Deceased.-
The trial court in an uxoricide case did not err in permitting 
the People to introduce on rebuttal a letter purportedly written 
b~' the dee-eased to a judge two days before she was shot, in 
[5] See CaLJur.2d, Evidence, § 422 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence, 
§ 482 et seq. 
U C.J4-e 
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which letter the deceased itemized alleged sales of used cars 
made by defendant without a license, stated that defendant had 
threatened to kill her and expressed her fear of him, where the 
letter was admitted, with a limiting instruction, solely to show 
the deceased's state of mind, not to show that defendant had 
threatened her, and was therefore not objectionable as hearsay, 
and where the letter tended to prove her fear of defendant, 
which was relevant to defendant's claim that she was the ag-
gressor in a struggle for the gun. 
[11] Criminal Law - Compelling Production of Evidence: Wit-
nesses - Impeachment - Testimony Impeachable. - The trial 
court did not err in refusing to order the prosecution in an 
uxoricide case to produce certain rent receipts and in admon-
ishing the jury to disregard defense counsel's statement that 
he would prove the receipts to be forgeries, as against the 
assertion that defendant should have been permitted to use 
the receipts to impeach the prosecution's witness who testified 
on cross-examination that she had never forged a rent receipt 
for the deceased and that she had seen the deceased pay rent 
to defendant and defendant give receipts for it, where the 
question whether rent receipts had been forged to deceive the 
welfare authorities was collateral to the issues being tried, 
where the trial court had discretion to foreclose further inquiry 
along that line, even for purposes of impeachment, where de-
fense counsel offered to show merely that the receipts were 
forged by the prosecution's witness "or someone else," and 
where such showing with regard to the particular receipts in 
question might have been consistent with the witness' testimony 
and its value as impeachment was therefore questionable. 
[12] Witnesses-Impeachment-Testimony Impeacha.ble.-Where 
defendant on direct examination in an uxoricide case testified 
in detail as to the finances of his household, which had appar-
ently given rise to numerous quarrels with the deceased, and 
in particular stated that she had paid him no rent, and where 
in a prior and unrelated criminal proceeding he had testified 
that a certain check constituted payment of rent she owed 
him, which testimony directly contradicted the statement made 
by defendant on direct examination, it was within the discre-
tion of the court to permit defendant to be questioned on cross-
examination for purposes of impeachment as to his own prior 
inconsistent statement. 
[13] Id.-Mode of Testifying-lliustrating Testimony: Self-incrim-
ina.tion-Waiver.-Where defendant testified on direct ex-
amination in an uxoricide ease that he had been carrying a 
loaded pistol inside his beIt, that his shirttails were tucked 
in 80 that the gun was plainly visible, that he had 8CUftled with 
his wife for possession of the gun and that it had gone off 
Cl~ the struggle, it was proper cross-examination to require 
o 
o 
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him to put on the shirt he had worn on the night of the killing, 
to show how he had carried the gun, and to demonstrate with 
an assistant district attorney his and his wife's movements 
during the alleged struggle, and he waived his privilege ngainst 
!'elf·incrimination ns to thl'se mntters when he voluntarily 
rai!'ed them on direet examination. 
[14] Criminal Law-Argument of Counsel-Inferences From Evi-
dence.-A suggestion by the prosecutor in his closing argument 
in an uxoricide case that the deceased had been shot initially 
in the back as she turned to run away was based on a reason-
able interpretation of the evidence and was therefore within 
the scope of permissible argument where, though there was 
no evidence of the order in which the deceased received the 
various wounds, there was evidence that a wound in her back 
marked the entrance of a bullet, and where, from the position 
in which the body was found and other evidence, it clearly 
could be inferred that the deceased had turned to run. 
[15] Id.-Argument of Counsel-Comment on Lack of Testimony. 
-It was proper for the prosecutor in an uxoricide case to 
argue that if the prosecution's eyewitnesses were unable to see 
the killing from their bedroom window, as the defense had 
suggested, defense counsel would have requested that the jury 
view the premises, it being generally permissible to argue that 
an adverse inference should be drawn from the opposing party's 
faiiure to produce the strongest available evidence. Defense 
counsel could have responded to such argument pointing out 
that a countervailing inference could be drawn from the 
prosecution's failure to request II view. 
[16] Id.-Appeal-Presumptions-Jury: Harmless Error-Mis-
conduct of Prosecuting Attomey.-Where the prosecutor in an 
• uxoricide case misstated the law when he told the jury that 
the killing of a human being while in the commission of a 
felony, namely, assault with a deadly weapon, was :first degree 
murder, but shortly thereafter corrected his error and apolo-
gized to the jury, and the court gave accurate instructions 
on murder and its degrees and repeated those instructions at 
the jury's request shortly before the verdict was returned, it 
must be presumed that the jury followed the court's instruc-
tions and that defendant was not prejudiced by the prosecu-
tor's misstatement of the law. 
[17] Homicide-Instructions-Degrees of Offense.-The instruc-
tions in an uxoricide case were not erroneous as permitting 
the jury to convict defendant of first degree murder without 
finding malice aforethought where the court clearly defined 
murder in terms of malice aforethought, the next succeeding 
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termination of degree, and all instructions on lying in wait 
expressly presupposed a finding of murder. 
[18] ld.-Murder-Killing by Lying in Wait.-The elements nec-
essary to constitute murder by lying in wait are watching, 
waiting and concealment from the person killed with the inten-
tion -of inflicting bodily injury on such person or of killing 
such person. 
[19] ld.-Instructions--Murder-Killing by Lying in Wait.-There 
was sufficient evidence in an uxoricide case to justify giving an 
instruction on lying in wait where the testimony of one neigh-
bor indicated that defendant waited behind his wife's house 
for over an hour, where there were admissions by defendant 
that he parked a block away to conceal his presence, that he 
waited behind the house for about 25 minutes, that he was 
watching for the headlights of his wife's car, and that he sur-
prised her by stepping out "right into her face," and where 
from the fact that he had armed himself with a loaded pistol 
and the evidence indicating that he shot her almost immediately 
on her arrival, the jury could reasonably conclude that he was 
waiting for her with the intention of shooting her and that 
the shooting was accomplished "by means of" his watching 
and waiting in concealment. 
[20] ld.-Evidence-Mental State.-Where defense counsel in his 
offer of proof in an uxoricide case stated that proposed medical 
testimony would bear on defendant's ability at the time of 
trial to remember what had occurred, but there was no sug-
gestion that it would bear on malice aforethought, premedita-
tion or deliberation, the record did not show that evidence 
relevant to these issues was excluded. 
[21] ld.-Evidence-Mental State.-Where defendant in an ux-
oricide case offered to elicit a doctor's opinion as to whether, 
in view of defendant's state of mind at the time of the shoot-
ing and after his arrest, it would be "normal" for him not to 
remember the details of the shooting or his statements to the 
police, and also proposed to ask the doctor about the reflex 
action of the trigger finger of a person under stress, the trial 
court erred in ruling that the jury could evaluate these mat-
ters without the help of an expert, both the mental stress 
created by involvement in a killing and the effect of such 
stress on finger reflexes being sufficiently beyond common ex-
perience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier 
of fact. 
[22J ld.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence.-Erroneous exclu-
sion of medical testimony in an uxoricide case as to defend-
ant's mental condition at the time of the shooting and after 
his arrest did not result in a miscarriage of justice where, 
though testimony as to reflexes of the trigger finger of a person j 
(:J 
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under stress might have made defendant's story of a struggle 
more credible, there was abundant evidence inconsistent with 
a struggle to sustain a conviction of first degree murder, in-
cluding the distance from which the shots were apparently fired, 
the proximity in which five empty cartridge casings were found, 
the fact t~at defendant had armed himself and waited for his 
wife, the cry heard by the neighbors, and the fact that virtually 
every bullet in defendant's gun entered her body, where de-
fendant was shown to have lied repeatedly to the police after 
his arrest and to have lied under oath in a prior criminal pro-
ceeding, where the evidence inconsistent with defendant's story 
of a struggle for the gun was abundant and convincing, and 
where there was no reasonable probability that admission of 
the excluded medical testimony would have persuaded the 
jury to reach a different result. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b» from a judgment of the Superior Court of Butte 
County and from an order denying a new trial. A. B. Ware, 
Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
the death penalty, affirmed. 
J. R. King, Jr., under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, and Doris H. Maier, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
, TRAYNOR, J.-A jury found defendant guilty of murder 
in the first degree and fixed the penalty at death. The trial 
court denied his motion for a new trial and sentenced him to 
death. This appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. 
(b).) 
Defendant was born in 1917 and was reared in a mountain-
ous community in eastern Tennessee. He attended school only 
through the third grade and cannot read or write anything 
except his name. Some time between 1943 and 1946 he moved 
to California and worked in various localities as an agricul-
turallaborer and a welder. He first met the deceased, Marcella 
Katherine (Farris) Atchley, when he was working near Fresno 
in 1953. He saw her a number of times before he left the Fresno 
area, and she bore a child that he claims is his. Defendant 
eventually entered the used car business in Palermo, Cali-
fornia. He bought several lots, built houses on them, and lived 
166 PEOPLE 'V. ATCHLEY [53 C.2d 
in one of the houses with Jewel Spoon, a woman who served. 
as his secretary and bookkeeper. He met thc deceased again 
in ]956 when she came to buy a uscd car. She returned fre-
quently and after a series of fights with Jewel Spoon moved 
into defendant's home with five of her children. Jewel retired 
to a trailer behind the house and later left town. Defendant 
and the deceased quarreled frequently, but late in 1957 they 
took a trip and were married in Georgia. They did not pub-
licize their marriage, hoping to avoid a reduction in the 
aid that she and her children were receiving from the county 
welfare department. 
During the last few days of July, 1958, Mrs. Atchley and 
her children moved out of defendant's home to a house in 
Gridley, California. Although defendant assisted in making 
the move, a quarrel ensued and Mrs. Atchley complained to the 
police. Defendant then informed welfare personnel of her 
marriage to him. She in turn informed the authorities that 
defendant had been selling used cars without a license. 
On the night of August 2, 1958, Mrs. Atchley went to a 
dance at Robinson's Corners with her oldest daughter and a 
young married couple. About 12 :15 a. m. she drove her 
daughter home and then drove the young couple to their 
home in Oroville. 
Defendant spent that evening drinking beer with several 
friends, but there is no evidence that he became drunk. Some 
time after midnight he drove to his wife's house in Gridley 
and discovered that she was not there. He drove back to 
Palermo, looking for her at Robinson's Corners and at sev-
eral taverns along the way. He then returned to Gridley 
and drove by her house again. Noticing that her car was still 
absent, he parked his car about a block away and took from 
a glove compartment a 22-caliber pistol loaded with six or 
seven bullets. He placed the pistol inside the belt of his 
trousers and approached the house on foot through a back 
alley. He then waited in the alley and in the back yard, where 
he could see the headlights of his wife's car when she drove in. 
About 2 :25 a. m. Mrs. Atchley drove up to the carport at-
tached to one side of her house. While she was parking, de-
fendant moved along the opposite side of the house and stood 
by the front corner. Mrs. Atchley walked around to the front 
gate and up the walk. As she neared the door, defendant 
stepped out towards her. In the ensuing few minutes she was 
shot once in the head, once in the left breast, three times under 
the right arm, and, according to the prosecution's experts, once 
o 
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in the back. Her body was later found about 3 feet from the 
front walk on the side opposite the point where defendant 
had stepped out. She was lying face down with her feet 
towards the walk and her head towards the carport. 
Following the shooting defendant drove back to Palermo. 
He buried the gun in his back yard and hid the holster in an 
ash can: lIe then went to bed, where the police found him 
about 4 a. m. 
At the trial defendant conceded most of the foregoing facts 
but maintained that he had been told that his wife was going 
out with another man, that he had taken the gun only to 
scare them, and that he had no intention of killing or injuring 
his wife. He stated that when he saw her returning alone, 
he stepped out to greet her; that his shirttails were tucked 
in 80 that the gun inside his belt was clearly visible; that she 
seized. the gun and he struggled to recover it; that the gun 
went off several times during the struggle; and that after he 
recovered it, he fired it several more times. The defense intro-
duced much testimony that Mrs. Atchley had said she wished 
to kill defendant, that she had threatened him with a gun on 
several occasions, and that she was a violent and combative 
person. 
Two neighbors testified for the prosecution that they were 
awakened by the voice of a woman crying hysterically, "Oh, 
don't. don't," followed by a series of shots. Looking out their 
bedroom window they saw defendant in a stooping position, 
shooting towards the ground. Because an intervening fence 
'obscured the body, they assumed that he was shooting at the 
tires on Mrs. Atchley's car. They and another neighbor, who 
saw defendant arrive and walk into the back alley, testified 
that his shirttails were out. Defendant admitted at the trial 
that the gun inside his belt would not have been visible had 
his shirttails been out. To rebut defendant's story of a struggle 
for the gun, the prosecution introduced evidence that all of 
the shots were fired from such a distance that the deceased 
could not have been holding the gun at the time, that Mrs. 
Atchley was found with her keys still clutched in her right 
hand, and that five empty cartridge casings were found so 
close to each other as to indicate that the shots had been fired 
with the gun in approximately the same position. Other evi-
dence indicated that defendant had threatened his wife, that 
she was afraid of him, and that most of the threats and all of 
the acts of violence attributed to her occurred during the 
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Defendant contends that the trial court committed preju-
dicial error in admitting certain evidence. He argues first 
that certain photographs introduced by the prosecution werp. 
gruesome in character, were unnecessary to the prosecution's 
case, and were offered several days before they were to be used 
by the expert witnesses, for the sole purpose of inflaming and 
prejudicing the jury. 
[1] When allegedly gruesome photographs are presented, 
the trial court in the exercise of its judicial discretion must 
decide whether their probative value outweighs their possible 
prejudicial effect. (People v. Bmbaker, ante, pp. 37, 48 
[346 P.2d 8]; People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 751 [312 
P.2d 665] ; People v. Cheary, 48 Cal.2d 301, 312 [309 P.2d 
431] .) [2] In the present case some of the challenged 
photographs show the deceased as she was found in her front 
yard, with bullet holes and bloodstains on her dress and blood 
on her face. They were used to illustrate testimony about her 
wounds and to show the relative positions in which the body 
and various items of evidence were discovered. Other photo-
graphs show the deceased lying on a table at the mortuary, 
naked above the waist, with blood smeared on her face. These 
pictures were used to show the location and nature of her 
wounds and to explain the basis for expert opinions as to the 
position of the gun when the shots were fired. Although many 
of these photographs are decidedly unpleasant to view, they 
are not comparable to those held inadmissible in People v. 
Redston, 139 Cal.App.2d 485, 490-491 [293 P.2d 880], or 
People v. BU1'ns, 109 Cal.App.2d 524, 541-542 [241 P.2d 308, 
242 P .2d 9], where the deceased was shown with a shaved head 
and disfigured by an autopsy. In view of their probative 
value, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting 
them. [3] It was also within the discretion of the trial court 
to permit aU the pictures taken by the same photographer 
to be identified at the same time, even though many of them 
were not to be used until later in the trial. 
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in per-
mitting the introduction of a tape recording of a conversation 
between defendant and his insurance broker, Ray J. Travers. 
The conversation took place in the interrogation room of the 
county jail two days after defendant had been arrested and 
before he had obtained a lawyer. Defendant was unaware 
that his words were being recorded and did not know that 
Travers had formerly been a police officer or that he had 
agreed to question defendant so that the recording could be 
C) 
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made. In response to Travers' questions defendant admitted 
arming himself, concealing himself, watching and waiting for 
his wife, surprising her, and firing several shots while the gun 
was in his hand. He maintained however, that the shooting oc-
curred during a struggle for the gun and that he had no inten-
tion of killing the deceased. Defendant contends that these re-
corded statements constitute a confession and that they were 
made involuntarily because Travers held out as an inducement 
the payment to Mrs. Atchley's children of the proceeds of an 
insurance policy on her life. The People contend that de-
fendant's recorded statements do not constitute a confession 
and were therefore admissible even if involuntary. 
There has been considerable confusion as to the admissibility 
in a criminal proceeding of statements allegedly made by the 
defendant involuntarily. (See People v. Idnden, 52 Ca1.2d 
1, 29, footnote 8 [338 P.2d 397].) Many opinions distinguish 
"confessions" and "admissions," and state that the latter 
are admissible without regard to their involuntary character. 
(E.g., People v. Ada.ms, 198 Cal. 454, 465 [245 P. 821] ; People 
T. Powler,178 Cal. 657, 664-665 [174 P. 892] ; People v. Garcia, 
124 Cal.App.2d 822, 825-826 [269 P.2d 673] ; People v. Tra-
wick, 78 Cal.App:2d 604, 608 [178 P.2d 45] ; People v. Cum-
mings, 7 Cal.App.2d 406, 408 [46 P.2d 778] ; see People v. 
Wolfe,42 Ca1.2d 663, 670 [268 P.2d 475] ; People v. Ferdi'Mnd, 
194 Cal. 555, 568-569 [229 P. 341].) The distinctions between 
• confessions and admissions, however, are "subtle and question-
able."1 (People v. Chessman, 52 Cal.2d 467, 493 [341 P.2d 
679].) Moreover, a number of early cases suggest that even 
admissions must be excluded if involuntary. (People v. Skem 
Ak F'ook, 64 Cal. 380, 381, 382 [1 P. 347] ; People v. White, 
47 Cal.App. 400, 401 [190 P. 821] ; People v. Harris, 45 Cal. 
App. 547, 551 [188 P. 65] ; People v. Quan Gim Gow, 23 Cal. 
'For example, in People v. Arnold, 108 Cal.App.2d 719 [239 P.2d H9], 
the defendant was charged with murdering two men, Cavness and Green· 
way. His statement to the police after his arrest that he shot Greenway 
"because he saw me shoot Cavness" was characterized as a "statement 
of hiI reason for shooting" and held to be an admission, not a confession. 
In Peopu: v. Cryder, 90 Cal.App.2d 194 [202 P.2d 765], the defendant 
made an allegedly coerced confession to robbery and a subsequent lltate· 
ment, alllO allegedly coerced, that his confession was in the main correct. 
The latter statement was held not to be a confession. In People v. 
CrOfl.ellitch, 86 Cal.App. 646 r261 P. 309], the defendant was charged 
with burglarizing eertain hotel rooms. After he was arrested and lIome 
of the stolen property found in his possession, he was asked when he had 
entered the rooms. Bis reply that •• all the rooms were entered betw_ 
two and four o'clock, as people were 80nnd asleep at that time" .... 
Ul4 aot to be a confession. 
o 
170 PEOPLE V. ATCHLEY [53 C.2d 
App. 507, 510-512 [138 P. 918].) [4] More recently, this court 
has stated that "the necessity for determining thc voluntary 
character of the statement does not depend upon whether or 
not it constitutes a confession of guilt." (People v. Nagle, 
25 Ca1.2d 216, 222-223 [153 P.2d 344] ; sce People v. Gonzales, 
24 Ca1.2d 870, 874-875 [151 P.2d 251].) We have required 
preliminary proof of the voluntary character of statements 
that include "an important incriminating fact." (People v. 
Nagle, supra; see People v. Eggers, 30 Ca1.2d 676, 689 [185 
P.2d 1] ; People v. Quan aim Gow, 23 Cal.App. 507, 512 [138 
P. 918].) Limitation of the exclusionary rule to full con-
fessions has been rejected not only by the foregoing opinions 
of this court (People v. Eggers, supra; People v. Nagle, supra; 
People v. Gonzales, sttpra), but also by the American Law 
Institute (Model Code of Evidence rule 505) and the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Uni-
form Rule of Evidence 63 (6); see also 78 A.B.A. Rep. 134). 
Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has held 
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires exclusion of coerced admissions if they are sufficiEmtly 
damaging. (Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 [66 S.Ot. 
544,90 L.Ed. 667]; but cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 
162-163, footnote 5 [73 S.Ct. 1077, 97 L.Ed. 1522].) 
[ 5 ] Involuntary confessions are excluded because they 
are untrustworthy, because it offends "the community's sense 
of fair play and decency" to convict a defendant by evidence 
extorted from him, and because exclusion serves to discourage 
the use of physical brutality and other undue pressures in 
questioning those suspected of crime. (People v. Berve, 51 Cal. 
2d 286, 290, 293 [332 P.2d 97] ; see Watts v. Indiana, 338 
U.S. 49, 54 [69 S.Ct. 1347, 1357, 93 L.Nd. 1801]; Lyons v. 
Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 605 [64 S.Ot. 1208, 88 L.Ed. 1481].) 
All these reasons for excluding involuntary confessions apply 
to involuntary admissions as well. (See Opper v. United States, 
348 U.S. 84, 90-92 [75 8.Ct. 158, 99 L.Ed. 101] ; Falknor, The 
Hearsay Rule and Its Excepiifms, 2 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 43, 68.) 
[6] Accordingly, any statement by an accused relative to 
the offense charged is inadmissible against him if made in-
voluntarily. 
[7] The People contend, however, that the voluntary 
nature of defendant's statements was adequately shown before 
the recording was admitted into evidence. Travers testified 
that no threats were made, that no inducements were offered, 
and that in an earlier conversation defendant had volunteered 
() 
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substantially the same statements without· being asked. De-
fendant at no ~ime contradicted this testimony or suggested 
that any of his recorded statements were -tmtrue. Moreover, 
the recorded conversation demonstrates that Travers referred 
to the insurance policy to explain why he' was asking ques-
tions and not as an inducement for any particular answers. 
The trial court listened to the tape in chambers before ruling 
on its admissibility. There is therefore no merit in defendant's 
contention that the recording was admitted without a proper 
showing that his statements were made voluntarily. 
Defendant also contends that the recording was obtained 
by such fraud that its use as evidence was inconsistent with 
due process. He relies primarily on Leyra v. D('Inno, 347 U.S. 
556 [74 8.Ct. 716, 98 L.Ed 948]. In that c~ the police, having 
promised a suspect medical treatment for ~n acutely painful 
attack of sinus, introduced as the "doctor:" a highly skilled 
psychiatrist with a considerable knowledge of hypnosis. The 
psychiatrist used threats, promises of leniency, and expressions 
of sympathy to reduce the physically exhausted suspect to 
almost trance-like submission. Use of his resulting confessions 
violated due process, largely because they were the product 
of "mental coercion." [8] Although there was" a similar 
• deception in the present case, there was no comparable mental 
coercion. The deception itself does not render defendant's 
statements inadmissible, for it was not of a type reasonably 
likely to procure an untrue statement. (People v. Connelly, 
195 Cal. 584, 597 [234 P. 374] ; People v. CasteUo, 194 Cal. 
595,602 [229 P. 855].) 
[ 9 ] While cross-examining Travers as to the voluntariness 
of defendant's recorded statements, defense counsel attempted 
to ask whether defendant had complained to Travers of not 
being permitted by the police, despite numerous requests, to 
talk to a lawyer. The trial court sustained an objection to this 
question and explained to the jury that the answer would have 
no bearing on the question of voluntariness. Defendant cor-
rectly contends that this ruling was erroneous, but fails to 
show that it was prejudicial. Although a refusal to permit 
defendant to talk to counsel suggests an intent to coerce, it 
seems highly improbable that either the trial judge or the 
jury would have inferred coercion from such a refusal alone 
in the light of the substantial and uncontradicted evidence 
that no coercion occurred. 
[10] Defendant contends that the trial court «rcd in 
lpermitting the People to introduce on rebuttal a letter pur-; 
() 
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portedly written by the deceased to Judge Savage two days 
before she was killed. The letter itemized alleged sales of 1UIed 
cars made by defendant without a license, stated that defend-
ant had threatened the deceased, and expressed her fear of 
him. Defendant contends that the introduction of this letter 
on rebuttal was prejudicial because he was unfairly sur-
prised late in the trial and because several prosecution wit-
nesses who could have been examined with regard to the 
letter and its contents had been finally discharged and could 
be recalled by defendant only as his own witnesses. The 
letter was admitted, however, with a limiting instruction, 
solely to show the deceased's state of mind and not to show 
that defendant had threatened her. It was therefore not 
objectionable as hearsay. (People v. Brust, 47 Cal.2d 776, 
784-785 [306 P.2d 480] ; Adkins v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 255-259 
[193 P. 251].) It tended to prove her fear of defendant, 
which was relevant to defendant's claim that she was the 
aggressor in a struggle for the gun. Since the claim of self-
defense was raised as part of the defendant's case, the letter 
was admissible in rebuttal. 
[11] Defendant contends that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in refusing to order the prosecution to pro-
duce certain rent receipts and in admonishing the jury to 
disregard defense counsel's statement that he would prove 
the receipts to be forgeries. Defendant asserts that he should 
have been permitted to use the receipts to impeach the prose-
cution's witness, Barbara Farris, who testified on cross-
examination that she had never forged a rent receipt for the 
deceased and that she had seen the deceased pay rent to 
defendant and defendant give receipts for it. The question 
whether rent receipts had been forged to deceive the welfare 
authorities was clearly collateral to the issues being tried. 
The trial court had discretion to foreclose further inquiry 
along that line, even for purposes of impeachment. (See Wit-
kin, California Evidence, § 673.) Moreover, in support of his 
request for the receipts, defense counsel offered to show merely 
that they were forged by Barbara "or someone else." Such 
a showing with regard to the particular receipts in question 
might well have been consistent with Barbara's testimony. Its 
value as impeachment, therefore, was questionable. 
[12 ] Defendant also contends that the trial court erro-
neously permitted the prosecution to cross-examine him im-
properly. The assistant district attorney asked him whether 
or not he had told the truth while testifying under oath in a 
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prior and unrelated criminal proceeding. D;efendant argues 
that this questioning was not proper impea~hment and was 
beyond the scope of matters raised on his exan;..ination in chief. 
(See Pen. Code, § 1323.) On direct examijlation, however, 
defendant testified in detail as to the finances of his house-
hold, which had apparently given rise to numerous quarrels 
with the deceased. In particular, he stated that she had paid 
him no rent. In the prior proceeding he ha<J. testified that a 
certain check constituted payment of rent she owed him. This 
testimony directly contradicted the statem~t made by de-
fendant on direct examination. Even though the matter was 
collateral to the issues being tried, the trial court had dis-
cretion to permit the defendant to be qu~tioned for pur-
poses of impeachment as to his own prior inconsistent state-
ment. (See Witkin, California Evidence, § 673.) 
[13] Defendant was also asked on cross-examination to 
demonstrate certain aspects of his alleged struggle with his 
wife. He argues that this demonstration violated his privilege 
against self-incrimination and that it was ~ot proper cross-
examination because not restricted to matters about which he 
was examined in chief. Defendant testified on direct exami-
nation that he had been carrying a loaded! pistol inside his 
belt, that his shirttails were tucked in so that the gun was 
plainly visible, that he had scuffied with his wife for pos-
session of the gun, and that it had gone off during the struggle. 
On cross-examination he was required to put on the shirt he 
had worn on the night of the killing, to show how he had 
carried the gun, and to demonstrate with an assistant dis-
trict attorney his and his wife's movements during the alleged 
struggle. These matters were clearly raised by his direct 
testimony. He was also asked how long his wife's arms were, 
and replied that they were about the same length as his own. 
He was then asked to hold the gun at arm's length pointed 
towards himself with a finger touching the trigger. The dis-
tance from the muzzle to his body was measured and found 
to be 10 inches. This part of the demonstration, in combina-
tion with the testimony of the prosecution's experts that the 
gun was fired from at least 24 inches away, was directly re-
lated to defendant's statement on direet examination that the 
gun had gone off while he and his wife were struggling for 
it. The entire demonstration, therefore, was within the scope 
of permissible cross-examination (Pen. Code, § 1323; People 
v. Ortiz, 66 Cal.App. 154, 156 [225 P. 462]), and defendant 
waived his privilege against self-incrimination as to the mat-
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ters involved wIlen he voluntarily raised them on direct exami-
nation. (People v. ATrighilli, 122 Cal. 121, 126 [54 P. 591] ; 
People v. GaUagher, 100 Cal. 466, 474-476 [35 P. 80] ; People 
v. Withers,73 Cal.App.2d 58, 60-61 [165 P.2d 945].) 
[14] Defendant contend" that the prosecution wa!; guilty 
of prejudicial misconduct in its closing argument. TIH' assist-
ant district attorney suggested to the jury that the deceased 
had been shot initially in the back as she turned to run away. 
Defendant complains that this suggestion was based on facts 
not in evidence. There was evidence that a wound in the 
deceased's back marked the entrance of a bullet. From the 
position in which the body was found and other evidence, it 
clearly could be inferred that the deceased had turned to run. 
Although there was no evidence of the order in which she 
received the various wounds, the assistant district attorney's 
suggestion was nonetheless based on a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the evidence, and was therefore within the scope of 
permissible argument. (People v. Oheary,48 Ca1.2d 301, 317-
318 [309 P.2d 431] ; People v. BUI"U'ell, 44 Ca1.2d 16, 39-40 
[279 P.2d 744].) 
[15] The assistant district attorney also argued to the 
jury that if the prosecution's t'yewitnesses were unable to see· 
the killing from their bedroom window, as the defense had 
suggested, defense counsel would have requested that the jury 
view the premises. The basis for defendant's objection to this 
argument is not clear. It is generally permissible to argue to 
the jury that an adverse inference should be drawn from the 
opposing party's failure to produce the strongest available 
evidence. (Of. Pen. Codt', § 1323.) l\Iorevt'r, Mfensc counsel 
had ample opportunity to respond to the argument or to 
point out that a countervailing infrrenee could be drawn from 
the prosecution's failure to request a view. 
[ 16] The assistant district attorney misstated the law, 
however, when he told the jury that the killing of a human 
being while in the commission of a felony, to wit, assault with 
a deadly weapon, is murder of the first degree. (See Pen. 
Code, § 189.) Shortly thereafter he corrected his error and 
apologized to the jury. The court gave accurate instructions 
on murder and its degrees, and repeated those instructions 
at the jury's request shortly before the verdict was returned. 
It must be presumed that the jury followed the court's in-
structions and that defendant was not prejudiced by the as-
sistant district attorney's earlier misstatement of the law. 
[17] The trial court instructed tht' jury that murder is in 
the first degree if perpetrated by lying in wait. (Pen. Code, 
C) 
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§ 189.) Defendant contends that the court's instructions 
were erroneous in that they permitted the jury to convict de-
fendant of murder in the first degree without finding malice 
aforethought. The court, however, clearly defined murder in 
terms of malice aforethought.2 The next succeeding instruc-
tion differentiated the finding of murder from the determina-
tion of degree.s All instructions on lying in wait expressly 
presupposed a finding of murder.4 Defendant's contention 
is therefore without merit. 
Defendant also contends that there was insufficient evidence 
to justify giving an instruction on lying in wait. [ 18 ] The 
elements necessary to constitute lying in wait are watching, 
waiting, and concealment from the person killed with the in-
tention of inflicting bodily injury upon such person or of 
killin~ such person. (People v. Thomas, 41 Ca1.2d 470, 473 
[261 P.2d 1].) [19] The testimony of one neighbor indi-
·"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice afore-
thought. 
"Such malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is 
manifested a deliberate intentiou unlawfully to take away the life of a 
fellow creature. It is implied when no considerable provocation appears, 
or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and 
malignant heart. 
"Malice aforethougllt, either express or implied, is manifested by the 
doing of an unlawful and felonious act intentionally, deliberately, and 
witllout legal cause or excuse. It does not imply a pre'existing hatred 
or enmity toward the indh'idual injured." 
·":M:urder is classified into two degrees, and if you should find the 
defendant guilty of murder, it will be your duty to determine the 
degree of the offense, whether first or second." 
." All murder which is perpetrated by means of lying in wait, or by 
any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing is murder 
of the first degree, and all other kinds of murder are of the second 
degree." 
'I All murder which is perpetrated by means of lying in wait is murder 
of the first degree. 
"To constitute lying in wait, as the term is used in tilese instructions, 
a person's conduct must involve an intent to take another person unawares 
so as to do him bodily injury, and must include, as a means to that end, a 
waiting and watching for an opportune time to do t.he act, and also either 
a concealment in ambush or some other secrecy of design to take tIle 
other person by surprise. 
"Lying in wait does not require any particular position of the body, 
or that the designing person refrain from moving about, or that he entice 
or trap the object of his design into any strange or puzzling situation, 
or that the lying in wait continue for any particular period of time, pro-
vided that its duration is such as to show a state of mind equivalent 
to premeditntion and dt']iJ.)('ra~ ion." 
"When the killing of a Illlm:m being amounts to murder and is ac· 
complished by lying in wait, it is murder of the first degree even though 
there did not exist in the mind of the slayer the specific intent to kill, 
but it is necessary that there be the intentional inflicting of bodily injury 
upon the person killed under circumstances likely to cause his death." 
o 
176 PEOPLE v. ATCHLEY [53 C.2d 
cated that defendant waited behind his wife's house for over 
an hour. The evidence included admissions by defendant that 
he parked a block away to conceal his presence, that he waited 
behind the house for about 25 minutes, that he was watching 
for the headlights of his wife's car, and that he surprised her 
by stepping out" right into her face." From the fact that he 
had armed himself with a loaded pistol and the evidence indi-
cating that he shot her almost immediately upon her arrival, 
the jury could reasonably conclude that he was waiting for 
her with the intention of shooting her and that the shooting 
was accomplished "by means of" his watching and waiting in 
concealment. There was therefore sufficient evidence to justify 
giving the instruction. 
[20] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in 
excluding certain medical testimony as to defendant's mental 
condition at the time of the shooting. He relies on People v. 
Wells, 33 Ca1.2d 330 [202 P.2d 53], which holds that medical 
testimony as to mental state is admissible to show lack of 
malice aforethought or lack of premeditation and delibera-
tion. In his offer of proof, however, defense counsel stated 
that the proposed testimony would bear on defendant's ability 
at the time of the trial to remember what had occurred. There 
was no suggestion that it would bear on malice aforethought, 
premeditation, or deliberation. (Cf. People v. Wells, supra, 
at 345.) The record does not show, therefore, that evidence 
relevant to these issues was excluded. 
[21] Defendant did offer to elicit the doctor's opinion 
as to whether, in view of defendant's state of mind at tbe 
time of the sbooting and after bis arrest, it would be "normal" 
for him not to remember tbe details of tbe sbooting or his 
statements to tbe police. He also proposed to ask the doctor 
about tbe reflex action of tbe trigger finger of a person under 
stress. The trial court ruled that the jury could evaluate 
these matters without tbe help of an expert. Both the mental 
stress created by involvement in a killing and the effect of 
such stress on finger reflexes, bowever, were "sufficiently be-
yond common experience tbat tIle opinion of an expert would 
assist the trier of fact." (People v. Colc, 47 Ca1.2d 99, 103 
[301 P.2d 854, 56 A.L.R.2d 1435] ; George v. Bekins Van ct 
Storage Co., 33 Ca1.2d 834, 844 [205 P.2d 10371.) As to both 
matters, therefore, tbe trial court's ruling was erroneous. 
The erroneously excluded evidence was significant because 
defendant relied primarily on the theory tbat tbe shooting 
was accidental or in self-defense. Since no other witness ob-
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served the first shots, it was critical whether the jury believed 
his story of a struggle for the gun. The proposed testimony 
as to reflexes might have served to render that story more 
credible by providing an explanation of why so many shots 
were fired and why defendant continued to shoot after re-
covering possession of the gun. The proposed testimony as 
to defendant 's inability to remember might have served to 
make defendant appear more truthful by rebutting the prose-
cution's suggestion that he was lying about his memory.' 
[22] Upon examination of all the evidence, however, it 
does not appear that the erroneous exclusion of this medical 
testimony resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (See Cal. 
Const., art. VI, § 4%.) Although the testimony as to reflexes 
might have made defendant's story of a struggle more credible, 
there was abundant evidence inconsistent with a struggle, 
including the distance from which the shots were apparently 
fired, the proximity in which the five empty cartridge casings 
were found, the fact that defendant had armed himself and 
waited for his wife, the cry heard by the neighbors, and the 
fact that virtually every bullet in defendant's gun entered 
her body. Although the testimony as to defendant's inability 
to remember might have met one line of attack on his credi-
bility, other lines of attack were given far more emphasis by 
the prosecution. Defendant was shown to have lied repeatedly 
to the police after his arrest and to have lied under oath in a 
prior criminal proceeding. Moreover, his credibility was im-
portant primarily as it affected the jury's belief in his story 
of a struggle for the gun. The evidence inconsistent with that 
story was abundant and convincing. There is therefore no 
reasonable probability that admission of the excluded medical 
testimony would have persuaded the jury to reach a different 
result. (See PeopZe v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818,836 [299 P.2d 
243].) 
The judgment and order denying a new trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., 
and White, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
30,1959 . 
